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This article is concerned with the international market consolidation in television 
entertainment production and its implications. The rapid growth of the TV format trade 
during the past 15 years has led to the formation of large European-led production 
groups. In recent years, U.S. media conglomerates have bought the largest of these 
groups. By tracing the groups’ development and the reasons for the U.S. acquisitions 
and by offering a model for the potential adverse implications this may have for 
television production and distribution in Europe, this article hopes to make a valuable 
contribution to media industries and policy research.  
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Throughout the 20th century, the United States led the international sales of movies and TV 
fiction practically unrivaled, with a global market share of around 70% (Doyle & Paterson, 2008). In 
addition, the country sold franchise licenses for the local production of game and quiz shows (Chalaby, 
2012a; Moran, 2013). U.S. clout was not limited to economic power, though. In Europe, the commercially 
experienced U.S. networks significantly influenced television culturally, too. The new private commercial 
channels (those launched across Europe throughout the 1980s and 1990s in particular) imitated 
management strategies from across the Atlantic, adopting new genres, scheduling techniques, and 
production values (Esser, 2001).  
 
The 21st century still sees the United States at the top of the international TV programming 
trade. In 2013, the United States had an export-import surplus of $13.4 billion with Europe, where its key 
international customers reside (European Audiovisual Observatory [EAO], 2014). Even so, the first decade 
of the new millennium, as I will demonstrate in the first half of this article, saw a notable shift in both 
trade and influence between Europe and the United States. European companies moved to the forefront of 
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a rapidly growing business: the trade in TV formats. This trade encompassed the older franchised genres 
of game and quiz shows and, importantly, added the new genre of reality TV. Today there are hundreds of 
internationally licensed formats, including Deal or No Deal, Got Talent, and Next Top Model, which are 
produced in local versions around the world. Most originate in Europe. 
 
The global production value of the format market in 2008 was nearly $3.6 billion and has since 
continued to rise. European firms generate two-thirds of this value, with British companies holding a 
prominent place (Jäger & Behrens, 2009; Stephens, 2012; TRP Research, 2015). The commercial success 
of the European format producers and the international reputation they gained as a result thereof led to 
the conspicuous growth of several multinational European-headquartered production groups, including 
Endemol, FremantleMedia, All3Media, and Zodiak Media. The format business, it is tempting to believe, is 
a further manifestation of what Tunstall (2008) has described as the “decline of the U.S. mass media.”  
 
Although this is true in some respects, this article demonstrates that it is not the case if 
ownership is taken into account. While European producers have experienced significant growth and built 
substantial multinational production groups during the first decade of the 21st century, along with—for the 
first time in the history of European television—attendant international sales companies spanning the 
globe, the gains made by these European producers during the formative years of the format trade are 
now partly being reaped, in various forms, by long-standing U.S. media conglomerates. 
 
Since 2010 these conglomerates have used their deep pockets to acquire additional European 
broadcasters and cable and satellite channels and operators, including the British cable operator Virgin 
Media (Liberty Global); pan-European broadcasters Scandinavian Broadcasting Systems and Eurosport 
(both Discovery Communications); Britain’s Channel 5 (Viacom); and Poland’s largest private commercial 
broadcast network, TVN (Scripps), to name a few. The leading traditional U.S. media players have also 
acquired the largest of the newly formed and rapidly grown European production groups.  
 
I maintain that a combination of three factors caused the large-scale U.S. acquisitions of 
European production groups:  
 
1.  The international success of the European-led TV format business and reality genre and the 
subsequent formation of multinational (in some cases, global) production groups, which, in the 
words of Mark Kaner, president of 20th Century Fox Television Distribution, turned into the U.S. 
majors’ “biggest marketplace opponents” (in Jäger & Behrens, 2009, p. 116).  
 
2.  Technological development leading to the multiplication of distribution platforms for audiovisual 
content, the entry of new financially strong players, and intensifying competition for content.  
 
3.  Low interest rates and resulting opportunities for producers and private investors to achieve 
substantial financial gains from mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The latter spurred the 
formation of the European-led production groups, which subsequently became attractive takeover 
targets for the U.S. majors.  
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This article continues by outlining its theoretical and methodological grounding. It then explores 
the development of the format trade and the formation of some of the major European production groups 
associated with it. Revealed are a shift in the historic (im)balance in television entertainment away from 
the United States toward Europe, the magnitude and speed of European-emanating M&A activities during 
the first decade of the 21st century, and the role that private investment played in this. Two later sections 
illuminate the phase of U.S. acquisitions that followed and the management strategies behind these 
acquisitions.  
 
Driving this research is the assumption that ownership configuration matters. It matters because 
it determines what gets produced, who produces it, and how and for whom it is produced (Doyle, 2013; 
Hardy, 2014; Wasko, 2014)—at least to a certain degree and at key moments in market development. 
Furthermore, we might add, it can determine the extent to which generated intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) are exploited and where the resulting profits go. The final section hence examines the implications 
of an increasingly interconnected global market for television entertainment. It concludes with a 
preliminary model for grasping and outlining the shifts in power and the potential adverse implications 
that the new ownership and continuing international integration may have at the national level in Europe.  
 
The larger picture provided in this article through the diachronic, European perspective and the 
preliminary impact model are only the first step of a larger project. For a meaningful, sound analysis of 
transnational market trends and their potential long-term implications, both the macro and meso levels 
need to be considered. Regrettably, one article does not provide enough space to engage with the various 
sets of theories and differing research expectations and demands involved. The second step, a case study 
of the British TV market, which renders possible the study of local agency, structure, and attendant 
powers, will therefore be discussed in a subsequent article (Esser, forthcoming). The case study will also 
allow for the impact model introduced at the end of this article to be empirically tested and refined. 
 
Theoretical and Methodological Grounding 
 
The concerns driving this research fall under the tradition of critical political economy (CPE), the 
inquiries of which historically center on how specific forms of media ownership, market concentration, and 
corporate imperatives impact on the strategies and operations of media industries, media production, and 
labor. One central belief in CPE scholarship is that transnational corporations (TNCs) have been a vital and 
growing factor in reshaping the media systems of countries around the world. As eminent CPE scholar 
Robert McChesney maintains: “What distinguishes the emerging global media system is not transnational 
control over exported media content, however, so much as increasing TNC control over media distribution 
and content within nations” (2010, p. 189). A more recent CPE concern has been the financialization of 
the media sector, that is 
 
the extraordinary growth in the size of the financial sector and financial assets relative 
to the industrial and other sectors of the economy . . . to a condition where financial 
capital and, crucially, financial models drive the strategies and evolution of the rest of 
the economy. (Winseck, 2011, p. 143) 
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This implies that the availability of cheap loans causes recurrent waves of international expansion 
via mergers and acquisitions (Hardy, 2014; Jin, 2011; Winseck, 2011). The financialization of the 
television sector and TNCs’ market power and control over domestic media production and distribution are 
central to this study; I consider them of vital importance for media research. This does not imply that this 
study draws on ideas and research emanating from CPE scholarship alone, though. Acknowledging that 
local agency and structure also hold power and that capitalism is a rather “complex adaptive system, 
deeply conflictual in its processes and effects” (Cunningham, Flew, & Swift, 2015, p. 152), I aim to remain 
open to different theoretical perspectives and to be guided by the empirical findings.  
 
Other perspectives that inform this study come from television scholarship interested in the 
sustained dominance of the U.S. majors with regard to exported television content and finding 
explanations for this. Notably, Hoskins and Mirus (1988) pointed to the historical lead U.S. television 
producers have in creating commercially oriented entertainment. Havens (2006) noted the advantage that 
the U.S. majors have through their unrivaled global sales networks and attendant market power. More 
recently, television scholars have highlighted the growing financial pressures within the domestic 
American television market, raising the importance of the international market for the U.S. majors (Bielby 
& Harrington, 2008; Magder, 2009; Torre, 2012).  
 
While international revenues have become indispensable for U.S. producers, it has rightly been 
noted that sales have suffered because of increasing regional trade and growing domestic production 
globally (Sinclair, Jacka, & Cunningham, 1996; Straubhaar, 2007; Tunstall, 2008). Pointing to audiences’ 
preference for local and regional content, these scholars repudiate CPE claims and concerns regarding U.S. 
media imperialism. McChesney’s—in my view, correct—response is that growing domestic production and 
regional trade constitute no contradiction to either globalization or media imperialism. The localization of 
media content, he notes, plays an increasingly crucial role in the management strategies of TNCs, which, 
“rather than flee in despair, have globalized their production” (2010, p. 205).  
 
This article supports McChesney’s claim by demonstrating the continuation of U.S.-based TNCs’ 
international expansion through foreign direct investment, which began in the mid-1980s and has been 
ongoing since, if unevenly (Hardy, 2014). Like the acquisitions and mergers of the 1980s and 1990s, 
which have been described as a mostly defensive response to liberalizing international markets (Curran, 
2002), today’s M&As in the field of TV production, too, seem to be largely defensive moves against the 
European-led global production groups as well as the threatening competition emanating from the new, 
but financially strong, online distributors. 
 
According to Doyle (2013) and Cunningham et al. (2015), online distributors like Amazon, Apple, 
Google, and YouTube weaken the power of the traditional media giants, such as Time Warner and 21st 
Century Fox, forcing them to adapt their strategies. Economic power, Doyle (2013) and Flew (2011) 
suggest, is likely to move away from the previous but now defunct bottleneck of television distribution and 
reconfigure around alternative sources of economic rents. Their assumption that IPRs become one such 
alternative is supported by the findings of this first, macro-level oriented part of the study. 
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The follow-on article, with its focus on local (British) agency and structure, will draw on 
scholarship associated with meso-level, particularly critical television industries, research (e.g., Havens, 
2006; Lotz, 2014). Methodologically, both articles draw on in-depth interviews with senior television 
executives and document analysis. Interviewees come from the commissioning, production, and 
distribution side. Documents analyzed include industry reports, trade press publications, company reports 
and websites, industry talks and roundtable discussions, and policy documents.  
 
Rise of the Format Business and Europe’s Role in It 
 
In the world of international television trade, a TV format is a franchised commodity, sold in the 
form of a “production bible” and consultancy services. Most formatted programs belong in the categories 
of game and talent shows (e.g., Dancing With the Stars, Top Model), reality TV and/or factual 
entertainment (I’m a Celebrity Get Me Out!, Supernanny, Come Dine With Me).2 There is an increasing 
genre hybridization, though, and a growing tendency to bring ever more genres into the format business, 
including TV drama series (Desperate Housewives, The Bridge) (Chalaby, 2015; Esser, 2013).  
 
From the 1950s until the mid-1980s, there were only a handful of licensed transatlantic 
adaptation deals between the United States, Europe, and Australia (Chalaby, 2012a; Moran, 2013). From 
the mid- to late 1980s, format sales of game shows increased notably. At the time, the American company 
All American Fremantle—which successfully sold, for instance, Family Feud, The Price Is Right, and Wheel 
of Fortune to numerous European countries—was the most prominent format exporter. Other format 
pioneers were the Australian company Grundy Worldwide, the UK’s Action group, and the Dutch firms JE 
Entertainment and John de Mol Productions (merging in 1994 to become Endemol Entertainment). 
 
The transnational popularity and commercial success of Survivor (1997, Strix/SVT, Sweden), 
Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? (1998, Celador/ITV, United Kingdom), Big Brother (1999, 
                                                 
2 Unfortunately, there is no unified usage of the terms reality TV and factual entertainment. In academic 
writing we find, for instance, Jensen (2009) dividing factual entertainment into lifestyle and reality TV, 
whereby the former is described as small talk with a focus on ordinary everyday experiences such as 
gardening or decorating; the latter as ordinary people experiencing emotional upheaval as they do, for 
example, in talent competitions. Chalaby (2015), on the other hand, uses reality TV as an umbrella term 
for factual entertainment (e.g., Faking It, Gogglebox), observational documentaries (e.g., One Born Every 
Minute) and reality competitions (e.g., Big Brother). In the television industry, the situation is similarly 
unclear, terminology depends on the field people are working in and also where they are located. In the 
U.S. the term factual entertainment is hardly used, reality TV is commonly used to refer to all kinds of 
non-fiction content featuring ordinary people. In the UK, both terms are common, but no clear definitions 
exist. For instance, the FRAPA report (Jäger & Behrens, 2009) divides formats into factual entertainment, 
game shows, reality, talent shows and scripted, but this is no uniform categorization. Ongoing genre 
hybridization makes it increasingly difficult to establish and retain clear boundaries. For the purpose of this 
article, where finer genre distinctions are moot, factual entertainment and reality TV have been used 
interchangeably. Both terms refer to non-fiction content that features ordinary people and is 
predominantly aimed at entertainment. 
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Endemol/Veronica, Netherlands), and Pop Idol/Idols (2001, Thames Television/ITV, United Kingdom) was 
a “game changer” (Chalaby, 2010). The format business expanded beyond the U.S.-Europe-Australia 
triangle and accelerated as a result of the enormous appeal that the new and cheap unscripted 
entertainment formats proved to have with audiences internationally. The extraordinary financial success 
of the above small, independent producers spurred other European producers to create and sell such 
formats. Emulating Endemol3 and FremantleMedia,4 which had expanded internationally by setting up and 
acquiring TV production companies during the 1990s, a new business model gradually emerged that 
increased both revenues and profits: Rather than sell franchise rights internationally, format owners now 
aimed to produce their shows themselves in as many markets as were viable (Chalaby, 2012b; Esser, 
2010a).  
 
The climate proved to be beneficial for the international expansion of these European companies: 
First and foremost, the initial “super formats” all came out of Europe, putting the spotlight on the 
continent. Second, capital markets provided cheap loans in the mid-2000s and again once the financial 
crisis lessened in 2009. Third, countries around the world opened up their television markets during that 
time. Even the historically difficult-to-penetrate U.S. market opened up to foreign formats, propelled by 
the Writers Guild of America strike in late 2007. The unexpected high ratings for several European shows 
and their comparative financial efficiency, coupled with the changing economic television ecology, ensured 
the U.S. market remained open (Esser, 2010b; Torre, 2012). It provided substantial revenues and, 
importantly, a critical global shopwindow for non-U.S. content and its producers.  
 
The U.S. majors, in contrast, were slow to realize and act on the business potential of 
internationally franchised reality TV. All American Fremantle, the former American format powerhouse, 
had been sold to the UK’s Pearson PLC in 1997, leaving the United States with a comparatively small stake 
throughout the formative years of what is now a well-established global business. In 2008, the U.S. share 
of revenue from global format sales was a mere 18% of the overall revenue generated by the top 10 
format export countries. The United Kingdom’s share was 34%, and Europe’s combined share was 64% 
(see Table 1).  
                                                 
3 Endemol, rather than its original name Endemol Entertainment, is how the company has been commonly 
referred to throughout its M&A history, which is too long and complex to be detailed here. The most 
significant milestones include its founding in 1994 in the Netherlands, its acquisition by the Spanish 
telecom and media corporation Telefónica in 2000, and then Berlusconi’s Mediaset and a consortium of 
investment companies (Goldman Sachs, Mediacinco und Cyrte) in 2007, after which it was delisted from 
the stock market. Endemol was restructured in 2012 in a debt-for-equity deal and until 2014 owned by 
the de Mol-backed asset management company Cyrte and private equity firm Apollo Global Management. 
In 2014 it was bought by 21st Century Fox and merged with Shine Group, which will be detailed later on 
(see Figure 3). 
4 FremantleMedia is the company name adopted in 2001 for a large and growing production and 
distribution network that, amongst others contains the former All American Fremantle via the latter’s sale 
to Pearson in 1997 and Pearson’s merger with CLT-UFA in 2001, which resulted in the RTL Group 
(FremantleMedia’s current owner). The group’s detailed history can be read up on on the company’s 
website (FremantleMedia, 2016), its current composition is shown in Table 5.      
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Table 1. Number of Exported Format Titles, Hours, and Revenues  
Generated Globally by the Top 10 Format Exporting Countries, 2008. 
 
 
               Note. Data are based on information provided in Jäger and Behrens (2009). 
 
 
Clearly, the new products and services offered by non-U.S. format developers challenged the 
structural conditions that had enabled the U.S. majors to erect and maintain trade barriers in global 
television entertainment for decades. 
 
Rise of the European Production Groups 
 
Endemol and FremantleMedia, historically the most eminent European format producers, had 
begun their international expansion through mergers and acquisitions in the mid-1990s (Chalaby, 2012b; 
D’Arma, 2012; Esser, 2001). But for the purpose of this article, I am specifically interested in the M&A 
activities from about 2004 until 2007 and from 2009 to today.5 It is during these periods that a 
remarkable number of European production companies with no broadcast affiliation, and thus without 
financial backing of a strong parent, underwent rapid international expansion. These companies—
including, most notably, All3Media, Eyeworks, Shed Media, Shine Group, Banijay Group, and Zodiak 
Media—developed a similar corporate structure to that of Endemol and FremantleMedia, which meant 
assembling multiple production outlets and one outfit specializing in international sales (Chalaby, 2010). 
Their size and structure subsequently made them attractive takeover targets for TNCs. 
 
But how did they grow so quickly? The extraordinary success of some of these companies and the 
new possibilities that formats afforded to the international exploitation of IPRs attracted the attention of 
                                                 
5 The growth period of these companies matches Jin’s (2011) findings from an extensive study of 
convergence and deconvergence activities in the media and communication sector between 2000 and 
2009. Deals surged between 2004 and 2007, when the global financial crisis began and then stalled for 
two years.  
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financial investors. Keen to partake in the opportunity to achieve above-average profit margins through 
rapid expansion, and benefiting from “cheap money” (Mahon, 2014), financial investors proved interested 
in supporting the owners of small European production companies in their growth ambitions. To give two 
examples, Banijay Group and Zodiak Media (Group)6 both expanded rapidly through multiple mergers with 
the help of private capital. Banijay was owned by five private investment groups,7 one of which, De 
Agostini Group, was also the main investor in Zodiak Media (see Figure 1).  
 
The “growing interest and confidence in the creative industries from both private and public 
markets” (Bradley, as quoted in Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2007, p. 234) also finds 
confirmation in the trajectory of the British-headquartered production groups, as affirmed by Patrick 
Bradley, director of the investment company Ingenious Media. In his witness statement to Britain’s 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport, Bradley revealingly added that investors would be attracted 
“only if such companies could achieve sufficient scale” and that “companies that are properly structured 
and advised can attract significant levels of finance without recourse to the ‘majors’” (Culture, Media and 
Sport Committee, 2007, p. Ev 234; emphasis added). Table 2 lists those European-led production groups 
that by 2010 had achieved the desired scale and structure—that is, multiple production outlets with an 
integrated sales office. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Today, the company refers to itself as Zodiak Media. It has dropped the Group label, which until 2015 
featured on its company logo, as shown in Figure 1. With Zodiak Media Group having merged with Banijay 
Group in 2016, its logo now reads Zodiak Media (on a blue background). Several name changes have 
occurred over the years in line with some major M&As. The name originated with Zodiak Television, 
founded in 2004 from a merger between Swedish production companies MTV Production and Jarowskij. In 
2005, private investors bought a 25% share and the company acquired producers in the United Kingdom, 
India, and Russia. In 2008, the De Agostini Group merged Zodiak Television with France’s Marathon Group 
and Italy’s Magnolia Productions (bought in 2007) and the company was renamed Zodiak Entertainment. 
Another important acquisition occurred in 2008 with one of the UK’s largest independent production 
groups, RDF Media Group. In 2010 the merged group changed its name to Zodiak Media (Group)—used 
both with and without “group” (Jäger & Behrens, 2009; Zodiak Media, 2015). The current name, Zodiak 
Media, has been adopted for the remainder of this article. 
7 Investment-holding firm LOV Group was the largest shareholder with 49%. Other financial investors 
holding the remaining 51% included Groupe Arnault, IFIL Investments, DeA Capital (the investment 
company of the Italian De Agostini Group), and Jean-Paul Bize (AMS Industries) (Courbit, 2015).  
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Figure 1. Production outlets of Banijay Group and Zodiak Media Group, 2015. The numbers in 
parentheses indicate the numbers of companies owned in these countries/operating under 
these labels. The exchange rate from December 20, 2014, was used to convert the annual 
revenues as stated in a trade journal for Banijay Group in British pounds (est. £300) 
(Televisual, 2014) and for Zodiak Media Group on the website of its subsidiary RDF Television 
(2015) in euros (€600). Figure created by the author, based on company websites. 
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Table 2. European-Led Production Groups with Multiple Outlets  
in at Least Two Countries and Integrated Sales Office, 2010. 
 
 
Note. Data are based on Chalaby (2015), Jäger and Behrens (2009), company reports, 
press    releases, and trade journal articles. 
 
The top half of Table 2 lists the independent—that is, non–broadcaster affiliated groups, the 
second those that are vertically integrated with major European broadcasters. As shown in the table, the 
latter—with the exception of FremantleMedia, the erstwhile format powerhouse, which has a consolidation 
history preceding the group’s acquisition by Bertelsmann in 2000—are small compared to the independent 
groups, whose rapid expansion via M&As was financed through private and public investment.  
 
 Private and public investors, Bradley failed to note, are not usually interested in sustained 
investment, though; their driving (and often exclusive) interest is profit. Private equity firms in particular 
aim to maximize profit in the short term, scaling the companies to the right size and whipping the key set 
of economic performance data into shape before selling on. According to industry sources (Heggessy, 
2014; Oliver & Ohlbaum Associates, 2013), it proved to be the scale that made the new, rapidly built 
production groups attractive for the U.S. majors. Meanwhile, the groups’ values multiplied. 
 
Production   
group
Founding 
year 
Owners
Head-
quarters
Number of 
territories
Number of 
companies
Independent
All3Media 2003
Equity fund Permira 
(majority owner) 
London 5 20
Banijay Group 2008 Investment consortium Paris 8 10
Endemol 1994
Investment consortium     
with Mediaset 
Amsterdam 31 80
Eyeworks 2001
Private shareholders    
(R. Oerlemans with 
venture capital) 
Amsterdam 17
4 (wholly 
owned)
Shed Media 1998
Shareholders, AIM stock 
market listed company
London 2 8
Shine Group 2001
Private shareholders       
(E. Murdoch, 53%)
London 10 26
Zodiak Media 2010 Investment consortium Paris 17 45
BBC Worldwide 1995 BBC London 7
3 (wholly 
owned)
FremantleMedia 2001 RTL Group/Bertelsmann London 22 25
ITV Studios 2009 ITV London 7
3 (wholly 
owned)
Red Arrow 
Entertainment
2010 ProSiebenSat.1 Group Munich 8
3 (wholly 
owned)
Strix Television 1988 Modern Times Group Stockholm 4 4
Vertically integrated
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“The Giants Are Awakening”: U.S. Conglomerates  
Acquire Most of the Largest Production Groups 
 
As noted, the U.S. majors’ investment in the format trade had been negligible during the crucial 
years when format sales became an established business practice. As recent as 2008, 54% of U.S. 
formats were sold via the distribution arms of four UK-based networks (Jäger & Behrens, 2009). But 
toward the end of the decade, this began to change; as Jäger and Behrens wrote in their industry report, 
“the giants [were] awakening” (2009, p. 116). Sony Pictures, which had already begun to set up local film 
production units during the 1990s, was the first U.S. major to redress its weakness in the format trade by 
acquiring a Dutch format distribution company, 2waytraffic, in 2008. 2waytraffic, through its acquisition of 
Celador International two years earlier, held one of the largest and most attractive format catalogs, 
including the IPRs for Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?, the world’s most successful format.8 
 
The prolonged delay of the other U.S. majors to counter the new competition and invest in local 
television production globally was increasingly addressed in trade literature, culminating in a 2009 
interview, during which Mark Kaner, president of 20th Century Fox Television Distribution, admitted: “As 
the global business has matured around the world, our biggest marketplace opponents are no longer other 
big U.S. studios. It is locally produced programming” (in Jäger & Behrens, 2009, p. 116). The strength of 
FremantleMedia and Endemol, he acknowledged, lay in their local production units around the globe.  
 
Soon after, and with liquidity in financial markets improving, the American media giants began to 
move. In 2010, Warner Bros. International Television Production (established in 2009) bought the 
majority of the UK’s Shed Media group, which had grown during the preceding five years with the help of 
public investment.9 Two years later, it made an unsuccessful $1.7 billion cash offer for struggling Endemol 
(Webdale, 2012). In 2014, Warner Bros. bought Eyeworks, which, through a raft of M&As, had become 
the sixth largest European TV production company (EAO, 2014, T.1.7).10 Another major U.S. acquisition in 
2014 was that of All3Media, jointly bought by Discovery Communications and cable giant Liberty Global. 
All3Media was Europe’s third largest production group (EAO, 2014, T.1.7), mushroomed through private 
equity–financed M&As between 2006 and 2014 (see Figure 2).11  
                                                 
8 2waytraffic, a format distribution company, was set up in 2004 in the Netherlands by Kees Abrahams, 
Taco Ketelaar, and Unico Glorie with the help of investor Henk Keilman. In 2006, it bought British Celador 
International with its extensive format catalog for $207 million. The deal significantly increased Sony’s 
presence in Europe, where approximately 8,000 hours of 2waytraffic programming aired in more than 40 
territories each year (Levine & Schreiber, 2008). 
9 Shed Media launched as Shed Productions in 1998. In 2005, the company floated on the AIM market, 
and with the nearly $67 million generated it subsequently acquired UK producers Ricochet, Wall to Wall, 
Twenty Twenty, and Outright Distribution (Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2007). 
10 Shareholders in Eyeworks most notably include its founder Reinout Oerlemans and Joop van den Ende, 
who bought 30% of the shares in 2006 via his venture capital firm Van den Ende & Deitmers (Jäger and 
Behrens, 2009). 
11 All3Media was established in 2003 by a group of former ITV executives. Three years later, equity fund 
Permira became the company’s majority shareholder (Televisual, 2014). Discovery Communications and 
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Figure 2. All3Media, Eyeworks, and Shed Media, 2015. The numbers in parentheses indicate the 
numbers of companies owned in these countries/operating under these labels. The exchange 
rate from December 20, 2013, was used to convert the annual revenues of Eyeworks, 
All3Media, and Endemol as stated in EAO (2014, T.1.7) in euros to U.S. dollars. The annual 
revenue figure for Shed Media comes from a different source (Televisual, 2014) and was 
converted from British pounds into U.S. dollars, also using the exchange rate of December 20, 
2013. Figure created by the author, based on company websites and the statistical yearbook of 
the EAO (2014, T.1.7). 
 
 
It was 21st Century Fox, though, that made the largest investment in the European content business. 
Acquisitions started in 2011, when News Corp bought Shine Group, founded by Rupert Murdoch’s daughter 
Elizabeth in 2001.12 Like All3Media, Shine Group had joined the M&A trail in 2006. By 2011, it comprised 
27 companies in 11 countries (Shine, 2015). The deal was followed three years later by the biggest deal in 
                                                                                                                                                 
cable giant Liberty Global—linked through John Malone, who has substantial shareholdings in both 
companies and is also chairman of Liberty Global—bought All3Media for a reported $930 million in 2014 
(Szalai, 2014).  
12 News Corp. was renamed 21st Century Fox when the company separated its entertainment and 
publishing assets in 2013. 
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the format business to date. At the end of 2014, 21st Century Fox and debt investment company Apollo 
announced a 50/50 joint venture combining Shine International, Endemol, and the Core Media Group. The 
merger created the world’s largest production group with an estimated valuation exceeding $2 billion and 
a network of more than 120 companies spread across six continents (Flint, 2014) (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Global spread of Endemol Shine, 2015. Figure created by the author, 
based on the companies’ websites, January 2015. 
 
 
 
Before the merger, Endemol had already been the largest European production group with a 
turnover of $1.73 billion, more than twice that of All3Media (number 3) and over three times that of its 
former key competitor, FremantleMedia (number 5) (EAO, 2014, T.1.7).13  
 
 
                                                 
13 The second biggest European production company in 2013 was Spanish Mediaproduccion SL. It does not 
feature here because it is not known for format production. The fourth largest was ITV Studios, with a 
turnover of $762 million (EAO, 2014, T.1.7).  
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Table 3 provides an overview of the current status of the formerly independent groups. Only 
Banijay Group, which merged with Zodiak Media in February 2016, can still be considered as independent. 
Although French media conglomerate Vivendi became involved in this latest megamerger—producing 
another production entity with revenues of around $1 billion—it is only a minority shareholder (Banijay 
Group, 2016). All other formerly independent groups are now part of various U.S. media conglomerates 
and, because of their new parent companies’ Europe-wide TV distribution outlets, are now vertically 
integrated.  
 
Management Strategies Behind the U.S. Investment 
 
What prompted these major investments in the European production groups? The analysis of 
expert interviews and industry documents has generated a list of strategies and objectives (see Table 4) 
that help explain the U.S. media conglomerates’ investment. The success of the format business was only 
part of the explanation.  
 
One key strategy identified is growing the content library to either secure attractive content for 
their own distribution channels or increase IPR ownership as a means of revenue (Bachmaier, 2015; 
Beale, 2015; Feistauer, 2015; Sweney, 2014). This corresponds with Doyle’s (2013) and Flew’s (2011) 
claims about the rising significance of IPRs due to expanding distribution as well as the importance of 
long-term exploitation in a fragmented media environment, where decreasing audiences lead to a 
reduction in advertising income.  
 
A second major strategy is diversification. Both geographical and product diversification not only 
expand the content library but reduce investment risks (Bachmaier, 2015; Beale, 2015; Oliver & Ohlbaum 
Associates, 2013; Sweney, 2014; cf. Doyle, 2013). Through their acquisitions, the U.S. conglomerates 
have added format products and technology to their production empire and, with this, the cost-effective, 
yet globally popular genres of reality and factual entertainment. The latter is where European producers 
are seen as particularly “innovative” (Lambert, 2016; Rooke, 2015) and “experienced” (Wong, 2016).  
 
Geographical diversification furthermore provides access to both “global talent and markets” and 
“know-how of local markets and cultures” (Bachmaier, 2015; Beale, 2015; Oliver & Ohlbaum Associates, 
2013). Accessing new products and technology, Bachmaier (2015) explained, helps satisfy the 
requirement for continuous innovation and product novelty, which is crucial in a competitive market 
environment. Also, in a business that is unanimously seen as hit-driven, employing talent from across the 
world increases the chances of owning the rights for “must-have” shows. Access to local sources of 
knowledge, on the other hand, is valued for facilitating both sales opportunities and local productions and 
for enhancing the “local qualities” of internationally adapted formats (Bachmaier, 2015).  
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Table 3. International Production Groups Owned by Private Investors  
and U.S. Conglomerates, 2016. 
 
 
 
Note. Data are based on company information and trade journal reports. 
Production 
group
Owners Head-
quarters
Production territories Key companies/production brands
Independent
Banijay(Zodiak) Investment 
consortium  
with Vivendi 
(26.2%)
Paris 19  Europe : Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, U.K.; other : 
Australia, Bogota, Mexico, 
New Zealand, India, Russia, 
U.S. (incl. BMP Latin)
> 65  including Air Productions, Ambra 
Banijay, Aurora Banijay, Brainpool, 
Bunim/Murray, Cuarzo-DLO, H20, 
Magnolia, Marathon, Non Panic, Nordisk 
Film TV, Pineapple Entertainment, RDF, 
Respirator, Screentime, Stephen David 
Entertainment; Distribution: Zodiak 
International
All3Media Liberty Global, 
Discovery
London 5  Europe : Netherlands, 
Germany, U.K.; other : 
New Zealand, U.S.  
20  All3 Media America, Apollo20, 
Bentley Productions, Company Pictures, 
IDTV, Lime Pictures, Lion Television, 
Maverick TV, MME Moviement, Neal 
Street, North One, Objective Media, 
One Potato Two Potato, Optomen, 
South Pacific, Studio Lambert, Zoo 
Productions; Distribution: All3Media 
International 
Endemol Shine 
Group
21st Century 
Fox,  
Investment 
company Apollo 
(50% each)
Amsterdam > 30  Europe : Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Denmark, 
Finland, Poland, Portugal, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, U.K.; other : 
Argentina, Asia, Australia, 
Brazil, Chile, India, Malaysia, 
Middle East, Russia, South 
Africa, Turkey, U.S.  
> 100  mostly Endemol branded; 
others: Artists Studio, Authentic 
Entertainment, Dragonfly, Gestmusic, 
Kuperman Productions, Kudos, 
Metronome, Minds Entertainment, 
Princess Productions, Remarkable 
Television, Reveille, Shine Australia/ 
France/Germany, Southern Star, True 
Entertainment, Zeppotron; Distribution: 
Endemol Shine International     
Sony Pictures 
Television, 
International 
Production
Sony Pictures 
Entertainment/ 
Sony
Various 10  Europe : France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
U.K.; other : Australia, Brazil, 
China, Colombia, Mexico, 
Russia
18  Electric Ray, Floresta, Huaso, Lean-
M, Left Bank Pictures, Playmaker Media, 
Silver River (including Gogglebox 
Entertainment), SPT France/Germany/ 
Latin America, Starling, Stellify Media, 
Teleset, Toro, Tuvalu, Victoria 
Television; Distribution: Sony Pictures 
International Distribution, part of which 
is SPI Formats Distribution (formerly 
2waytraffic)
Vertically Integrated 
Warner Bros. 
Entertainment/ 
Time Warner 
Warner Bros.  
International 
Television 
Production 
17 Europe : Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, U.K.; other : 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Chile, New Zealand, U.S.  
London    
(for U.K.   
and EMEA)   
> 15  Alloy Entertainment, BlazHoffski, 
Eyeworks (including At It Productions, 
Cuatro Cabezas, Egmont, Nordisk Film 
TV Finland, Savage, Touchdown, 
Eyeworks Brazil), Warner Bros. 
Television Production UK (formerly 
Shed Media, including Richochet, Wall 
to Wall, Twenty Twenty, Renegade, 
Yalli, Headstrong Pictures); 
Distribution: Warner Bros. International 
Television Distribution
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The third strategy identified is format specific: operate at all levels of the “format commodity 
chain” (Chalaby, 2015)—that is, conceive, produce, distribute formats, and produce subsequent local 
adaptations. It is about maximizing intellectual property exploitation and brand control. Buying the 
European-led production groups, which had increasingly and successfully pursued this strategy, meant 
that the U.S. conglomerates—in addition to procuring existing IPRs and the potential for attractive future 
generated IPRs—gained an established, well-functioning business model and attendant infrastructure 
(Bachmaier, 2015; Beale, 2015; Sweney, 2014; cf. Chalaby, 2105; Esser, 2010a, 2013).  
 
The old quest for synergies and cost reduction received comparatively little mention among the 
interviewees. However, economies of scale and scope are implied in the TV format model (cf. Chalaby, 
2012a). Moreover, one interviewee noted how production know-how and innovative ideas are transferred 
more quickly and cheaply between sister companies. This, he said, was something his company were keen 
to improve in the current environment of intense competition and changing consumption (Beale, 2015). 
Another interviewee noted how vertical integration reduces transaction costs because integrated producers 
are usually better informed than independent producers about what their sister distributors are looking for 
(Feistauer, 2015; cf. Chalaby, 2012b; Doyle, 2013).  
 
 
Table 4. Management Strategies Behind U.S. Acquisitions.  
 
 
Note. Data are compiled from interviews with industry executives and trade literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategy Objective/benefit
Reduce supplier risk through vertical integration
Gain competitive position through vertical integration
Grow opportunities for IPR exploitation through back-catalog expansion
Help feed content pipeline
Gain access to factual entertainment products and experienced creative talent for this genre 
Spread risk by adding the above to (finished) fiction-dominated program catalogs
Help feed content pipeline
Access global talent pool to satisfy need for continuous innovation and product novelty  
Increase chances to secure and own "must-have"/"hit" programs
Access global talent pool to reduce talent-related risks
Spread investment risk by operating in multiple markets 
Facilitate program sale and production opportunities in international markets 
Access local know-how to facilitate local productions and/or enhance their "local qualities" 
Maximize IPR exploitation by drawing revenue from all four format stages 
Improve brand control through speedy international roll-out and supervising local production
Swift and cheap transfer of production know-how and innovative ideas 
Reduce transaction costs through vertical integration
Grow content library
Geographical diversification
Operate at multiple levels of    
the format commodity chain
Generate synergies
Product diversification
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To summarize, at least some of the major U.S. media conglomerates have made good on their 
initial failure to realize the economic potential of reality entertainment and program franchising and of 
exploiting the format commodity chain. They have boosted their program catalogs, secured access to 
global talent and innovative ideas and know-how, reduced investment risks, and significantly upgraded 
their ability to produce local programs in key international markets. Through their acquisitions, they are 
now well positioned to meet the demand for local productions, and, at the same time, they have reduced 
their European competition through appropriation. Finally, through the newly achieved vertical integration 
in international markets, they have increased their competitive advantage over the new, financially strong 
online distributors and also, as I will argue in the final section, Europe’s long-standing national 
broadcasters.  
 
 
Implications of U.S. Ownership and Increasing Integration 
 
What are the implications? Clearly, the findings summarized in Table 4 indicate the production of 
television entertainment will continue to transnationalize. Horizontal integration implies an ever quicker 
and more extensive sharing of ideas and know-how, which in turn will accelerate the convergence of 
production patterns, values, and procedures and the types of television entertainment offered globally. 
Increasing transnationalization in turn causes further horizontal and vertical integration at the 
international level. In fact, the groups now owned by U.S. conglomerates were not alone in continuing 
their expansion. FremantleMedia, ITV Studios, Red Arrow Entertainment, and the Modern Times Group, 
too, have made additional significant investments since 2010, raising the number of both the companies 
they own and the territories they produce in. Only BBC Worldwide, the sole noncommercial broadcaster in 
the fold, has relinquished further notable growth (see Table 5).  
 
As far as the format trade is concerned, international expansion seems to intensify the softening 
of the traditional core–periphery division in audiovisual media. As Tables 3, 4, and 5 suggest, the owners’ 
outlook on production is increasingly global, and so is the composition of their production groups—both 
are conducive to multidirectional sharing. Interestingly, a recent graph by FremantleMedia reveals that the 
“rest of the world” format share (i.e. non-UK, U.S. and Netherlands) drastically rose in 2013 and 2014 
(see Figure 4).  
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Table 5. International Production Groups Owned by European Broadcasters, 2016. 
 
 
  Note. Data are based on company information and trade journal reports. 
 
 
 
Production 
group
Owners Head-
quarters
Production territories Key companies/production brands
BBC Worldwide BBC London 9 Europe : Denmark, France, 
Germany; other : Angola, 
Canada, India, Nigeria,  
South Africa, U.S.
4(7)  BBC Worldwide Productions 
(France, India, Nordics, U.S.); 
international equity stakes in Rapid 
Blue (South Africa, Nigeria, Angola), 
Tower Productions (Germany), Temple 
Street Productions (Canada); 
Distribution: BBC Worldwide 
FremantleMedia RTL Group/  
Bertelsmann
London 31 Europe:  Belgium, Croatia, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, U.K.; other : 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Dubai, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Mexico, Singapore, U.S.
>47 mostly Fremantle branded; 495 
Productions, Blu, Boundless West, Blue 
Circle, Crackerjack Productions, 
Fontaram, Four One Media, Kwai, 
Ludia, Miso Film, Naked Entertainment, 
No Pictures Please, Fortaram, Original 
Productions, Reg Grundy, Talkback 
Thames, Ufa, Wildside; Distribution: 
FremantleMedia International  
ITV Studios ITV London 8  Europe : Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, U.K.; other : 
Australia, U.S.
25  mostly ITV branded; 12 Yard, Big 
Talk, Cats on the Roof (including 
Gameface, Second Act and Crook 
Productions),  ITV Studios America 
(including Gurney, High Noon, Think-
factory, DiGa, Leftfield), ITV Studios 
Australia/France/Finland/Germany/ 
Norway/Sweden; Mammoth, Potato, 
Possessed, Screen, So Television, 
Shiver, Twofour Group (including Boom 
Wales, OSF, Indus, Mainstreet, 
Delightful Industries), Tarinatalo, Talpa, 
The Garden; Distribution: ITV Global 
Entertainment
Red Arrow 
Entertainment
ProSiebenSat.1 
Group
Munich 10  Europe: Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, U.K., other : Israel, 
Turkey, U.S.
19 Cove Pictures, CPL, Dorsey Pictures, 
Endor, Fabrik Entertainment, Half Yard, 
July August Productions, Karga Seven 
Pictures, Kinetic, Left/Right, Magic Film 
Flight, Nerd, Mob Film Company, 
Producers at Work, Redseven, Ripple 
Entertainment, Snowman, Studio 71, 
Sultan Sushi Entertainment; 
Distribution: Red Arrow International
Nice 
Entertainment 
(formerly MTG 
Studios)
Modern Times 
Group/Kinnevik
Stockholm 13 Europe : Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Finland, Hungary, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, 
Sweden; other : no
28  Baluba, Brain Academy, Grilli Films, 
Gong, Monster, Moskito Television, Nice 
Drama, Novemberfilm, One Big Happy 
Family, Paprika Latino, Playroom, 
Production House, Rakett, 
Redaktörerna, Strix, Strong, Titan; 
Distribution: DRG  
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Figure 4. Growth in origin of formats from Rest of World (RoW) nontraditional format markets. 
From Wallace (2015), based on data from the WIT/Wikipedia/C21/IMDb/FremantleMedia 
Research Department; includes all known nonscripted formats launched in two or more new 
territories between 2004 and 2014. 
 
 
What is unclear is whether the remarkable changes revealed in Figure 4 are the result of content 
buyers having become more open to producers from across the world or TNCs’ power to push programs 
into markets (increasing the visibility and international sales of their subsidiaries). In all probability, the 
two are intertwined and inseparable. Nevertheless, the abrupt rise of the RoW share in 2013 and 2014, 
after a relative stable share of around 27% during the preceding nine years, raises questions. If TNC 
market power were to be a vital cause for this jump, we would have to conclude that it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for nonintegrated entertainment producers to compete internationally (see Figure 5 
for a more detailed explanation). In sum, while the geocultural center–periphery dichotomy will further 
dissolve, the TNC–small domestic company dichotomy will compound. For comparison, the largest 
production groups have annual revenues of around $1 billion (over $2 billion in the case of Endemol). 
More than 80% of British independent producers have revenues of less than $1.6 million; of the remaining 
20%, half have a turnover of between $1.6 million and $8 million (Oliver & Ohlbaum Associates, 2013).  
 
It is the vertical integration of several of Europe’s largest production groups into the “first-tier” 
U.S. media corporations (McChesney, 2010) that should probably concern us more, though. The 
combination of ownership of (a) most of the globally significant entertainment producers (drama and 
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factual entertainment), (b) large content libraries (drama and factual entertainment), and (c) linear and 
nonlinear global distribution platforms—all three areas in which the U.S. media conglomerates have 
massively invested in the past five years—gives the latter the power to starve both newcomers and 
preexisting smaller (especially non–vertically integrated) TV distributors of attractive entertainment 
programs should they wish or feel the need to do so. I will return to this shortly.  
 
National media, in my view, are those most likely to be adversely impacted by international 
integration, vertical and horizontal. In Europe, historically grown structures, relations between market 
players, and consumption patterns as well as supportive media policies have helped national incumbents 
to counter the economic might of the U.S. distributors during the past 20 to 30 years. These advantages, 
which have been gradually diminishing, I fear, will further erode as a result of the recent U.S. acquisitions. 
The financial inequality between TNCs and national media players and the uneven market dynamics this 
inequality feeds are likely to gain in significance.  
 
Unfortunately, hugely varying market sizes and structures, as well as differences in regulation 
concerning independent production and IPRs, render it impossible to determine and generalize 
implications for Europe as a whole; meso-level studies like that being conducted for the follow-on 
publication are needed for this. But I want to conclude by offering a preliminary theoretical model 
outlining potential adverse implications that can then be tested and built on. The model, which is based on 
interim interview material, an analysis of various UK policy documents, and academic literature on media 
economics and runaway productions, consists of three figures, each focusing on a different site of 
potential implications: production (Figure 5); distribution, especially within the national broadcast market 
(Figure 6); and national policy (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 5 postulates that transnational production groups have a competitive advantage over 
small and nonintegrated producers because they can bundle programs for sales purposes (see #1) and 
advance large amounts of money for research and development (R&D) and deficit financing14 (#2). In 
addition, they have better access to program buyers and commissioners because of their brand power and 
ability to offer choice and bulk sales (#3) (Feistauer, 2015; Williams, 2015; cf. Doyle, 2013; Havens, 
2006). As a result, small national competitors, and especially new entrants to the entertainment 
production market, may find it increasingly difficult to get appointments with program buyers and 
commissioners and secure unallocated slots in program schedules. The evidence thus far also suggests, 
however, that personal contacts are key in the business and may mitigate TNC power (Feistauer, 2015; 
Mundye, 2016; Rooke, 2016; Williams, 2015; cf. Havens, 2006). Also, we need to consider that the 
integrated companies, which benefit from the various TNC powers listed in Figure 5, are national 
production companies, too. 
 
                                                 
14 Deficit financing is a system whereby producers share the financial risk of developing new programs 
with distributors, who pay a fee that is lower than the production costs. This system, which has a long 
history in the United States, was introduced to Europe fairly recently. The traditional European finance 
model is that of “cost-plus,” whereby broadcasters pay the full costs of the production, plus a fee to the 
production company for its work (Doyle, 2002). 
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Figure 5. Power of integrated TNCs and potential adverse implications  
in the production market for television entertainment. Figure created by the 
author, based on various academic sources and interviews. 
 
Potential adverse implications for the latter may be related to cultural changes within the 
organization (see #4). In particular, new corporate owners are likely to implement tighter profit demands 
and request that programs are developed with an eye to the international rather than the domestic market 
(Abraham, 2014; Bachmaier, 2015; Beale, 2015; cf. Cunningham et al., 2015). Of course, neither 
financial prudence nor producing for the international market are bad per se. But where they become the 
driving force, we can expect issues that are only of national interest or are too complex or contentious to 
work internationally to be no longer considered for production. Also, nationally oriented producers may be 
unable to fill this gap since they are likely to struggle to attract funding adequate to compete with the 
high-production-value fare developed and produced for the international market. 
 
Figure 6, concerned with program distribution, describes TNC powers that result from vertical 
integration (see #1) and financial might (#2). Both bear the potential for making commercially attractive 
content and hit talent unavailable for nonintegrated and/or financially weaker distributors.  
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Figure 6. Power of integrated TNCs and potential adverse implications in the distribution 
market. Figure created by the author, based on various academic sources,  
interviews, and policy documents. 
 
As far as the potential interference in program sales is concerned, proponents of mainstream 
economics will respond that TNC parent companies’ interest in profit maximization will detain them from 
keeping content within the conglomerate; their utmost interest being that productions are sold to whoever 
can afford the highest price. In those European countries where national free-to-air broadcasters still have 
notably larger audience shares than U.S.-owned cable and satellite channels and are fairly well funded, it 
is indeed still the case that the former have bigger program budgets (Feistauer, 2015; Williams, 2015), 
and this is especially true for domestic productions (Ofcom, 2015; Oliver & Ohlbaum Associates, 2013). 
However, we need to take into account that the U.S. conglomerates are currently investing on a major 
scale in both European free-to-air television channels and new online distribution platforms, because 
competition is heating up and the market is restructuring. At such a time, the conglomerates may well be 
willing to accept the financial costs of strategic, long-term decision making (cf. Doyle, 2002, 2013).  
 
 As to TNCs’ ability to outbid smaller competitors for talent and hit shows, both the BBC (2015) 
and BT (2015) have warned in an Ofcom (2015) consultation that this can seriously harm the long-term 
competiveness of British public-service broadcasters. The enormous sums paid for sports rights, which are 
no longer affordable for Europe’s national broadcasters today, may be a telling example.  
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Finally, Figure 7 addresses the site of national policy making. TNC powers here are threefold, with 
potential adverse implications for national regulators, labor, and citizens. The first power refers to TNCs’ 
heightened capabilities to move profits out of the country and reduce tax expenditure (see #1) by means 
of their vastly intricate, multilayered, and, as a result thereof, opaque company structures as well as the 
large numbers of tax advisers and attorneys they can afford to employ (Abraham, 2014; cf. Hardy, 2014). 
The second power refers to the greater negotiating leverage TNCs have with policy makers because of the 
financial investment they can promise or, alternatively, threaten to withdraw (#2) (cf. Christopherson, 
2006; Miller, Govil, McMurria, Maxwell, & Wang, 2005). The third refers to TNCs’ greater freedom from 
and lobbying capacity to resist public-service obligations (#3). The more influential TNCs become in 
European markets, the greater the focus on profit maximization in the market overall and, hence, the 
more quickly and irrevocably we can expect the normative ideas historically underpinning television in 
Europe to erode. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Powers of integrated TNCs and potential implications at the site of national policy 
making. Figure created by the author, based on various academic sources and policy 
documents. 
 
 
It should be noted that the model has been specifically developed for TV entertainment in an 
internationally, horizontally, and vertically integrated environment. As mentioned earlier, it will be 
empirically tested and revised in a study of the British television market (Esser, forthcoming).  
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Conclusion 
 
In this article, I argue that the first decade of the new millennium saw a notable shift in 
transatlantic trade flows and the origins of innovative, popular entertainment. European companies moved 
to the forefront of the rapidly growing market for formatted reality entertainment and, through extensive 
investment from private and public capital, built substantial international production groups within the 
space of only a few years. For the first time in the history of television, European companies led the way 
with a new, commercially attractive business model and built strong international distributors and large 
enduring, globally appealing program catalogs. From an ownership perspective, this transatlantic shift was 
short-lived, though. In the past five years, the U.S. media conglomerates, initially slow to realize the 
business potential of internationally formatted and locally produced content, have cemented their 
leadership in television entertainment by buying nearly all of the largest (available) groups. 
 
The explanation for the U.S. acquisitions turned out to be more extensive than catching up with a 
successful European business model and genre. In addition to reacting to the increase in demand for 
local/locally adapted productions and reality entertainment, the U.S. acquisitions were prompted by the 
changing market environment, which has led to intellectual property rights assuming a key strategic role. 
First, the rise in global competition at the distribution level has increased distributors’ need to secure 
content. Second, the progressively competitive and global entertainment market means unprecedented 
opportunities to exploit IPRs. By buying the European-led global production groups, the U.S. 
conglomerates have secured substantial program catalogs of mostly long-running factual entertainment 
and talent shows and access to creatives from around the world. They have further “globalized their 
production” (McChesney, 2010) with multiple benefits.  
 
Tunstall’s claim that “European and American media are increasingly becoming a single Euro-
American media industry” (2008, p. 251) has been proven right by this research. However, the findings 
also suggest that international business integration in television entertainment reaches beyond America 
and Europe; it is not just geocultural or geopolitical but increasingly global. As a welcome side effect, 
international integration contributes to advancing the globality and multidirectionality of flows. The long-
lasting core–periphery structure of the television program trade continues to weaken. More and more, we 
see a multidirectional exchange of content, talent, creative ideas, and capital. The type of ideas and 
content financed, produced, and traded this way is confined, however—limited to what is commercially 
attractive and has international appeal. 
 
Moreover, if we consider ownership, the findings suggest that we should refrain from concluding 
that “the media were American” (Tunstall, 2008). U.S. leadership in television entertainment may have 
been challenged somewhat by the talent of some European producers to create popular factual 
entertainment, successfully franchise it internationally, and then build a well-functioning business model 
around this with the help of private and public investment. Also, European creatives no doubt have gained 
in global influence and prestige, and this has further weakened the power of U.S.-based creatives. But it 
would be a mistake—as I have argued and attempted to demonstrate—to equate this with U.S. media 
conglomerates’ diminishing powers. On the contrary, the latter’s production acquisitions have increased 
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their power “to control media distribution and content within nations” (McChesney, 2010, p. 189). The 
logics of television’s ongoing transnationalization are complex and paradox. 
 
Exactly how the U.S. media conglomerates’ ownership of European production companies, in 
addition to their already substantial and growing ownership of distribution platforms, impacts European 
players and stakeholders—some in good, but from a socio-cultural perspective I suspect in some harmful 
ways—can only be established in meso-level studies. Europe has many, highly varied markets, and 
Hesmondhalgh (2013) rightly notes that for a sound understanding of power relations, we need to look at 
the totality of cultural production in a given market and interdependencies between firms. In other words, 
we need to look at local agency and structure. I would add that future place-specific studies, like my 
forthcoming U.K. case study, should also pay attention to whether—and, if so, in what regards—the 
location of TNC headquarters (still) matters. I hope that the indispensable broader perspective and 
preliminary impact model provided here will trigger meso-level studies across Europe and globally. It may 
be impossible to postulate a simple, invariably valid theory of ownership and its implications. But there 
can be no doubt that ownership matters.  
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